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It is a genuine pleasure to be here today to take part in such an interesting and important
discussion, and among such a distinguished group of scholars.   The comments I will offer are, of
course, my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve or its staff. 
I have been asked to talk about the revised Bretton Woods system in connection with the
non-China Asian economies.  I regard this as an exciting assignment, since, in my view, the most
interesting aspect of the Dooley-Folkerts-Landau-Garber (DFG) work is their attempt to explain
a key paradox in the international economic system today: that the labor-rich, capital-poor
developing economies of the world are exporting substantial amounts of capital to a mature,
capital-rich economy, the United States.  This can be seen in Figure 1, where the industrial
economies ran an estimated current account deficit of  $351 billion, whereas the developing
economies ran a surplus of $286 billion, with the global statistical discrepancy making up the
rest. Accordingly, I’m going to spend most of my time referring to the non-China developing
economies, and come back to Japan at the end.  2
In Figure 1, I’ve identified the non-China Asian developing economies I’d like to focus
on as: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  I’ve taken
Hong Kong out of this group, as it is hard to separate its current account balance from China’s. 
As may be seen, in 2004, the current account surpluses of the non-China Asian developing
economies are estimated at over $100 billion, well above the $54 billion surplus of China and
Hong Kong combined. 
It seems plausible that these large current account surpluses are, at least in part, the result
of official actions to keep exchange rates competitive.  As indicated in Figure 2, since 2002,
whereas the Federal Reserve’s index of the real value of the dollar against the industrial
economies (the red dashed line) has declined by some 25 percent, the value of the dollar against
the currencies of non-China developing Asia (the blue line) has fallen much less.  As indicated in
Figure 3, the non-China developing Asian economies have intervened substantially in foreign
exchange markets to keep their currencies from appreciating–in each of the last couple of years,
reserves (the blue line) have risen by more than $100 billion.  Partly in consequence (Figure 4),
real multilateral exchange rates in the region have remained about unchanged since 2002, even
as the euro, for example, has risen considerably.  
Why are relatively poor countries in developing Asia exporting capital to the United
States?  DFG argue that developing economies have an interest in keeping their exchange rates
competitive so as to promote export-led growth supported by foreign direct investment.  They
argue that this export-led strategy best achieves efficient economic development, even if it
forgoes the use of foreign savings.  Because the need to shift vast amounts of labor into the
modern sector implies that export-led growth will be needed for an extended period, DFG see3
these policies as lasting for many years.  Their argument appears to be focused on China. 
However, given that the authors appear to believe their theory is sufficiently general to
characterize much of the international monetary system, and to explain a large share of the U.S.
current account deficit, their theory implicitly seems to apply to the other developing economies
of the region as well.
I agree with DFG that the authorities in the non-China developing economies have been
acting to maintain the competitiveness of their exports.  However, I disagree that these policies
will be hardwired into the international monetary system for the foreseeable future.  Instead, I will
argue that the recent large current account surpluses in the region reflect the special, on-going
effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and once these effects wane, the surpluses will
wane as well. 
Figure 5 shows that relative to history, today’s outsized current account surpluses are
quite exceptional, and date only from the 1997-98 financial crisis.  Note that the region’s current
account averaged out to be roughly in balance from 1980 to 1997, even though these countries
have generally been pursuing export-led growth strategies for the period; export-led growth does
not require running massive current account surpluses.  Figure 6 plots these balances as a share of
GDP–even based on this measure, the post-1997 period has been usual for both the size and
sustained nature of these surpluses.  
What is the cause of these large surpluses?  I believe they stem from the weakness of
domestic demand in the region.  This weakness supports these surpluses directly, by dampening
imports.  This weakness also supports these surpluses indirectly, by leading the authorities to
focus on keeping their exchange rates competitive to maintain growth.  (To be sure, immediately2The runup of inflation in 1998 reflects the temporary effect of exchange rate
devaluations during the crisis, particularly in Indonesia.
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after the financial crisis, the desire to rebuild foreign exchange reserves was another reason why
authorities in the region intervened in foreign exchange markets to purchase dollars, but this
motive has likely diminished in importance as reserves have become very substantial).  Once
domestic demand revives, however, the authorities will likely be more comfortable with allowing
exchange rates to appreciate and allowing the stimulus from net exports to diminish.
The weakness of demand that I have referred to is evident in Figure 7–since 1997, growth
rates have averaged well below their previous pace.  You can see this even more clearly in Figure
8, which indicates that the output gap has been negative, so that GDP was below its potential
level, for the entire period since the financial crisis.  As a consequence, inflation has remained
subdued, notwithstanding the sharp runup in oil prices.
2  I would add that if undervalued
exchange rates had led to overheating and excessive inflation, this would have been an important
factor pushing the authorities to allow their currencies to appreciate, but such overheating and
high inflation has not materialized.  Moreover, one cannot attribute weak demand to tight
policies; monetary policy has been relatively accommodative, and interest rates have been low.
So, what accounts for the weakness of demand and growth in the region?  Figure 9 points
to the key mover in this story–the collapse in investment spending since the 1997-98 crisis, and to
levels below anything seen in the past two decades.  Keeping in mind that the current account is
equal to saving minus investment, it is clear that the massive swing in the region’s current
account from deficit to surplus mainly reflects the fall in investment.  A number of  factors
explain this collapse:
First, investment rates were probably too high or mis-allocated before the crisis, driven by5
over-optimistic expectations of future growth, and so the region was left with considerable excess
capacity after the crisis. 
Second, many firms were left with excessive debt after the crisis, particularly as the
domestic currency value of their dollar debt was inflated by depreciated exchange rates. 
Third, in addition to the decline in the demand for investment funds, the near-collapse of
domestic banking systems in the region likely contributed to a cutback in loan supply.  Bank
lending collapsed during the crisis (Figure 10) and remains subdued by historical standards. 
Finally, one would think that export expansion in the region would have spurred greater
investment in the export sector, but if this has happened, it certainly has not shown up in the
aggregate investment data.  I am not sure why that is the case.  One possible culprit is the
faltering of the global economy a few years after the Asia crisis (Figure 11), but this slowdown
was short-lived.  Perhaps more to the point, the downturn hit high-tech demand especially hard,
and this may have had more of an impact on the Asian investment climate.  As shown in Figure
12, for example, global semiconductor shipments peaked in 2000 and did not regain that level
until some three years later–presumably, excess capacity during this period would have damped
investment demand. 
Reflecting all of these factors, it is instructive that for much of the period since the 1997
financial crisis, equity prices in the region have not kept up with those in the United States
(Figure 13). 
From this perspective, the action of the authorities in the non-China developing Asian
economies is more understandable–they have been reluctant to weaken their export sectors, as
domestic spending did not appear primed to take up the slack.  Yet, it seems likely to me that at6
some point–which I think will be well short of some of the periods indicated in DFG’s
work–investment spending will revive, domestic demand will become more solidly established,
the authorities will be more comfortable in allowing their currencies to strengthen, and current
account surpluses will narrow.  
I base this view on several factors.  First, the share of investment in GDP is below
anywhere it has previously been in the past 25 years, and hence is likely to rise, once the factors
weighing on it ease.  Second, the evidence of other countries suggests that financial crises have
long lasting effects, but eventually those effects wane.  By now, corporate balance sheets in the
region have strengthened, excess capacity has likely eroded, the health of the banking sector has
improved, and the recovery of the global high-tech sector promises higher returns from future
investment.  Third, saving rates in the region have already been edging down from their pre-crisis
levels, and as a consumer credit culture continues to make inroads into the region, there is the
potential for further increases in consumer demand.   Finally, the fact that private international
capital flows to the region are growing–attracted by the dynamic, market-oriented economies of
the region–should give the authorities some comfort that investment demand could replace export
stimulus as a source of growth.
One issue some observers have posed is whether the non-China developing economies of
Asia would let their currencies appreciate if China did not.  Some suggest that as long as China’s
currency remains linked to the dollar at current valuations, other economies will not want to
threaten their competitiveness by allowing their own currencies to strengthen.  I agree that this
issue warrants consideration, although I cannot say how important it may prove to be.
I will conclude by recalling that my brief is to talk about non-China Asia, not just non-7
China developing Asia.  Therefore, I will offer a few observations on Japan.  On the one hand, as
suggested by Figures 14 and 15, Japan shares much in common with its neighbors: a history of
past current account surpluses that reflected declines in investment rates, and which, in turn,
reflected the outcome of a past financial crisis.  By the logic I used before, this might suggest that,
with the effects of the financial crisis waning and growth starting to establish itself, Japan, too,
may start to move away from current account surpluses. 
On the other hand, the pressures for a reversal of Japan’s current account surplus may be
less forceful than in the case of developing Asia.  First, Japan’s current account surplus is no
recent phenomena – it has been around for decades, suggesting that a sizeable current account
surplus may be a more permanent feature of Japan’s economy.  Second, as a consequence of a
long history of prior surpluses, Japan’s net international investment position is positive and
substantial–therefore, even if Japan runs balanced trade, its investment income will keep its
current account in surplus.  Finally, unlike developing Asia, Japan has a mature, capital-rich
economy that eventually will be supporting a dwindling population.  This, too, would seem to
militate against a dramatic rise in investment rates and associated decline in current account
surpluses.  (As one caveat to that, however, another consequence of an aging population may be
further declines in saving rates, and these could lead to reduced surpluses.)  
To conclude, there are several reasons why non-China developing Asia’s large current
account surpluses are not likely to last indefinitely.  I think similar arguments can be made for




Industrial Economies                     -351 
 
 United  States     -631 
 Japan       172 
 
Developing  Economies      286     
  
 C h i n a           38  
 Hong  Kong                 16 
 
  Non-China Developing Asia      106 
 
  Indonesia                6 
  K o r e a           28 
  M a l a y s i a                   14 
    Philippines                2 
  Singapore                28 
  T a i w a n         21 
    Thailand                     7 
 
Source: IMF WEO Sept. 2004 Database for aggregate Industrial and 
Developing Economies, and economies where full-year data are not 
available (the United States, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan); national sources for all else. 
 *Weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.
**An increase indicates dollar appreciation.
Figure 2
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Non-China Developing Asia**
2002:Q1 = 100*2004 is based on national sources for Korea, Singapore, and Thailand; and September 2004 IMF WEO Database for all else.
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Current Account**JP Morgan estimates.  Weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.
**An increase indicates domestic currency appreciation.
Figure 4
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Euro Area**
2002:Q1 = 100*2004 is based on national sources for Korea, Singapore, and Thailand; and September 2004 IMF WEO Database for all else.
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*2004 current account data is based on national sources for Korea, Singapore, and Thailand; and September 2004 IMF WEO Database for all else.  2004 
$US GDP for the region is from September 2004 IMF WEO Database.
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t*Annual average growth; weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.  Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand are estimates for 2004.
Figure 7










































Average Real GDP Growth, 1980-2004*Weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.
**Output gaps based on estimates of potential output derived from application of HP filter to actual output.
Figure 8







































Output Gap***Weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.
Figure 9














Saving / GDP*Weighted by country shares in $US GDP, averaged over 1980-2004.
**Excludes Taiwan and Indonesia
Figure 10
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